Capital requirement

Bank Runs and Panics: A Primer

A bank promises its clients immediate access to cash. Depositors can redeem their funds on demand at face value—first come, first served. Other short-term creditors can do the same, albeit at varying speeds, by not rolling over their loans. And, households and firms that pay a fee for a credit commitment can take down their loans at will.

For banks that hold illiquid assets, these promises of liquidity on demand are the key source of vulnerability. The same applies to other financial institutions (de facto or shadow banks) that perform bank-like services, using their balance sheets to transform illiquid, longer-maturity, risky assets into liquid, short-maturity, low-risk liabilities.

A bank run occurs when depositors wish to make a large volume of withdrawals all at once. A bank that cannot meet this sudden demand fails. Even solvent banks—those whose assets exceed the value of their liabilities—fail if they cannot convert their assets into cash rapidly enough (and with minimal loss) to satisfy their clients’ demands. A banking panic is the plural of a bank run: when clients run on multiple banks. We call the spread of runs from one bank to others contagion—the same term used to describe the spread of a biological pathogen.

In this primer, we characterize the sources of bank runs and panics, as well as the tools we use to prevent or mitigate them….

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The Costs of Inefficient Regulation: The Volcker Rule

By creating a new regime to limit threats to the U.S. financial system—including heightened scrutiny for systemic intermediaries and a new resolution framework—the Dodd-Frank Act (DFA, passed in July 2010) has made the U.S. financial system notably safer. However, DFA also included burdensome regulations that, in our view, reduce efficiency while doing little to improve resilience. The leading example of such a provision is DFA section 619, known as the Volcker Rule. As Duffie noted before regulators began to implement the Rule (see the citation above), it is not “cost effective.”

Ultimately, the need to focus on this overly complex and relatively ineffective regulation distracts both the government authorities and private sector risk managers from tasks that really would make the system safer. Not only that, but cumbersome rules almost surely increase pressure to ease regulation more broadly. This leads policymakers to scale back on things like capital requirements and resolution plans that we truly need to ensure financial system resilience.

In this post, we briefly describe the Volcker Rule, highlighting its complexity, its tenuous links to risk management, and its apparent negative impact on the financial system….

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Regulatory Discretion and Asset Prices

The Federal Reserve’s annual stress test is the de facto capital planning regime for the largest U.S. banks. Not surprisingly, it comes under frequent attack from bank CEOs who argue, as Jamie Dimon recently did, that “banks have too much capital…and more of that capital can be safely used to finance the economy” (see page 22 here). From their perspective, this makes sense. Bank shareholders, who the CEOs represent, benefit from the upside in good times, but do not bear the full costs when the financial system falters. As readers of this blog know, we’ve argued frequently that capital requirements should be raised further in order to better align banks’ private incentives with those of society (see, for example, here and here).

A more compelling criticism of central bank stress tests focuses on their discretionary character. To the extent feasible, central banks should minimize their interference in the allocation of resources by private intermediaries, allowing them to direct lending to those projects deemed to be the most productive.

But the painful lessons that have come from large asset price swings and high concentrations of risk provide a strong case for the kind of limited discretion that the Fed uses in formulating its stress tests. This blog post highlights why it makes sense for regulators to use this year's stress test exercise to learn how well the largest U.S. intermediaries would fare if the recent commercial real estate price boom were to turn into a bust....

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