Forward guidance

From Inflation Targeting to Employment Targeting?

Last year, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) modified its monetary policy framework to focus on average inflation targeting. They stated that “appropriate monetary policy will likely aim to achieve inflation moderately above 2% for some time” after “periods when inflation has been running persistently below 2%.” At the same time, the Committee scaled back efforts to preempt inflation, introducing an asymmetric “shortfall” strategy which responds to employment only when it falls below its estimated maximum. FOMC participants view these strategic changes as means to secure their legally mandated dual objectives of price stability and maximum employment (see our earlier posts here and here).

Prior to this week’s FOMC meeting, the Committee’s forward guidance explicitly balanced these two goals. However, in what we view as a remarkable shift, changes in the December 15 statement are difficult to square with any type of inflation targeting strategy. Despite the recent surge of inflation, the Committee’s new forward guidance removes any mention of price stability as a condition for keeping policy rates near zero. Instead, it focuses exclusively on reaching maximum employment.

In this post, we provide two reasons why such an unbalanced approach is concerning. First, a monetary policy strategy that ranks maximum employment well above price stability is unlikely to secure price stability over the long run. Second, FOMC participants’ projections for 2022-24 are a combination of strong economic growth, further labor market tightening and a policy rate well below long-run norms. This mix seems inconsistent with the large decline in trend inflation that participants anticipate. While policymakers certainly can and do revise their projections, persistent underestimates of inflation fuel the perception that price stability is a secondary, rather than equal, goal of policy….

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The QE Ratchet

When it comes to quantitative easing (QE), where you stand definitely depends on where you sit. That is among the conclusions of the important new report of the Economic Affairs Committee of the UK House of Lords.

The report provides an excellent survey of how it is that central banks now use their balance sheets. Its key conclusions are the following. First, central bankers should clearly communicate the rationale for their balance sheet actions, stating what they are doing and why. Second, policymakers should provide more detail on their estimates (and uncertainties) of the effectiveness of their various actions, especially QE. Third, they should be aware that the relationship between central bank balance sheet policy and government debt management policy poses a risk to independence. Finally, and most importantly, central bankers need an exit plan for how they will return to a long-run sustainable level for their balance sheet.

We discussed several of these points in prior posts. On communication, we argued that central bankers should be clear about their reaction function for both interest rate and balance sheet policies (see here). On the justification for policymakers’ actions, we emphasized the need for clear, simple explanations tied to policymakers’ objectives, distinguishing carefully between the intended purposes (such as monetary policy, lender/market maker of last resort, or emergency government finance; see here). And, on the relationship between QE and fiscal finance, we noted how the ballooning of the U.S. Treasury’s balance at the Fed in the early stages of the pandemic looked like monetary finance, putting independence at risk (see here).

In this post, we turn to the challenge that Lord King highlights in the opening quote: the need to ensure that central banks do not see bond purchases as a cure-all for every ill that befalls the economy and the financial system, causing their balance sheets repeatedly to ratchet upward….

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The Fed's New Strategy: More Discretion, Less Preemption

On August 27, marking the conclusion of the Fed’s first strategic review, the Federal Open Market Committee released an amended version of their fundamental policy guide—the Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy. The FOMC adopted a form of flexible average inflation targeting (FAIT). Partly because the new strategy largely confirms recent Fed behavior, the response in financial markets was minimal. Indeed, market-based long-run inflation expectations were virtually unchanged this week. Perhaps the only noticeable development was a modest steepening at the very long end of the yield curve.

In this post, we identify three key factors motivating the Fed review and highlight three principal shifts in the FOMC’s strategy. In addition, we identify several critical questions that the FOMC will need to answer as it seeks to implement the new policy framework. Specifically, the shift to FAIT implies a change in the Committee’s reaction function. How does this reformulated objective influence the FOMC’s systematic response to changes in economic growth, unemployment, inflation and financial conditions? Under FAIT, the effective inflation target over the coming years also now depends on past inflation experience. What is that relationship?

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Average Inflation Targeting

The Federal Open Committee’s first-ever comprehensive monetary policy review looks to be coming to an end. Since the announcement on November 15, 2018, the Fed has focused on strategies, tools, and communications practices, and engaged the public through numerous Fed Listens events, including a conference at which invited experts proposed new approaches (see our earlier post). At its July meeting, the FOMC discussed potential changes to its Statement on Longer-Run Goals and Monetary Policy Strategy—the “foundation for the Committee’s policy actions”—with the aim of finalizing those changes soon. And, Chairman Powell is scheduled to speak this week about the “Monetary Policy Framework Review” at the annual Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium.

Perhaps the most important issue on the review agenda is the FOMC’s inflation-targeting strategy. Since 2012, the FOMC has explicitly targeted an inflation rate of 2% (measured by the price index of personal consumption expenditures). A key objective of FOMC strategy is to anchor long-term inflation expectations, contributing not only to price stability, but also to “enhancing the Committee’s ability to promote maximum employment in the face of significant economic disturbances.” Yet, since the start of 2012, PCE inflation has averaged only 1.3%, prompting many policymakers to worry that persistent shortfalls drive down expected inflation (see, for example, Williams). And, with the Fed’s policy rate now back down near zero, falling inflation expectations raise the expected real interest rate, tightening financial conditions and undermining policymakers’ efforts to drive up growth and inflation.

In this note, we discuss one alternative to the current approach that has gained wide attention: namely, average inflation targeting. The idea behind average inflation targeting is that, when inflation falls short of the target, it creates the expectation of higher inflation. And, should inflation exceed its target, then it would reduce inflation expectations. Even when the policy rate hits zero, the result is a countercyclical movement in real interest rates that enhances the effectiveness of conventional policy….

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Monetary Policy in the Next Recession?

In many advanced countries, lowering the policy rate to zero will be insufficient to counter the next recession. In the United States, for example, with the target range for the federal funds rate at 1½ to 1¾ percent, there is little scope for the nearly 5 percentage-point easing that is typical in recent recessions (see, for example, Kiley).

This is the setting for this year’s report for the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum, written with Michael Feroli, Anil Kashyap and Catherine Mann. Our analysis focuses on the extent to which the “new tools” of monetary policy—including quantitative easing, forward guidance and negative interest rates—have been associated with an improvement of financial conditions. The idea is that the transmission of monetary policy to economic activity and prices works primarily through its effect on a broad array of financial conditions.

The USMPF report does not challenge the views of many researchers and of most central banks that the new monetary policy (NMP) tools have an expansionary impact even at the effective lower bound for nominal interest rates (see also the 2019 report from the Committee on the Global Financial System). However, we find that these new tools generally were not sufficient to overcome the powerful headwinds that prevailed in many advanced economies over the past decade.

Our conclusion is that central bankers should clearly incorporate the new tools in their reaction functions and communications strategies, but should be humble about their likely success in countering the next recession, at least in the absence of other supportive actions (such as fiscal stimulus)….

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Financial Crisis: The Endgame

Ten years ago this month, the run on Lehman Brothers kicked off the third and final phase of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. In two earlier posts (here and here), we describe the prior phases of the crisis. The first began on August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas suspended redemptions from three mutual funds invested in U.S. subprime debt, kicking off a global scramble for safe, liquid assets. And the second started seven months later when, in response to the March 2008 run on Bear Stearns, the Fed provided liquidity directly to nonbanks for the first time since the Great Depression, completing its crisis-driven evolution into an effective lender of last resort to solvent, but illiquid intermediaries.

The most intense period of the crisis began with the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. Credit dried up; not just uncollateralized lending, but short-term lending backed by investment-grade collateral as well. In mid-September, measures of financial stress spiked far above levels seen before or since (see here and here). And, the spillover to the real economy was rapid and dramatic, with the U.S. economy plunging that autumn at the fastest pace since quarterly reporting began in 1947.

In our view, three, interrelated policy responses proved critical in arresting the crisis and promoting recovery. First was the Fed’s aggressive monetary stimulus: after Lehman, within its mandate, the Fed did “whatever it took” to end the crisis. Second was the use of taxpayer resources—authorized by Congress—to recapitalize the U.S. financial system. And third, was the exceptional disclosure mechanism introduced by the Federal Reserve in early 2009—the first round of macroprudential stress tests known as the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP)—that neutralized the worst fears about U.S. banks.

In this post, we begin with a bit of background, highlighting the aggregate capital shortfall of the U.S. financial system as the source of the crisis. We then turn to the policy response. Because we have discussed unconventional monetary policy in some detail in previous posts (here and here), our focus here is on the stress tests (combined with recapitalization) as a central means for restoring confidence in the financial system….

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A Monetary Policy Framework for the Next Recession

Hope for the best, but prepare for the worst. That could be the motto of any risk manager. In the case of a central banker, the job of ensuring low, stable inflation and high, stable growth requires constant contingency planning.

With the global economy humming along, monetary policymakers are on track to normalize policy. While that process is hardly free of risk, their bigger test will be how to address the next cyclical downturn whenever it arrives. Will policymakers have the tools needed to stabilize prices and ensure steady expansion? Because the equilibrium level of interest rates is substantially lower, the scope for conventional interest rate cuts is smaller. As a result, the challenge is bigger than it was in the past.

This post describes the problem and highlights a number of possible solutions.

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Connect the Dots

How and what should the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) communicate to make monetary policy most effective? That is the question addressed by this year’s U.S. Monetary Policy Forum report (Language After Liftoff: Fed Communication Away from the Zero Lower Bound).

Over the past two decades, the FOMC has made enormous strides in promoting transparency. In sharp contrast to most of its previous history, the Fed now emphasizes that transparency enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy.

Yet, central bank communication is a work in progress. And, as the new USMPF report argues, there remains scope for improvement. In our view, the simplest and most useful change that the authors recommend, and that the Fed could implement—immediately and without cost—is to “connect the dots:” that is, to link (while maintaining anonymity) the published interest rate forecasts of each FOMC participant that appear in the quarterly “dot plot” (found in the Summary of Economic Projections, or SEP) to that same person’s projections of inflation, unemployment, and economic growth.

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The Fed: From forward guidance to data dependence

The goal of every central banker is to stabilize the economic and financial system—keeping inflation low, employment high, and the financial system operating smoothly. Success means reacting to unexpected events—changes in financial conditions, business and consumer sentiment, and the like—to limit systematic risk in the economy as a whole. But as they do this, policymakers try their best to respond predictably to news about the economy. That is, there is a central bankers’ version of the Hippocratic Oath: be sure you do not become a source of instability...

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Unconventional monetary policy through the Fed's rear-view mirror

On December 16, the Federal Open Market Committee is poised to hike interest rates, putting an end to the near-zero interest rate policy that began in December 2008. So, it’s natural to step back and ask what this episode has taught us about monetary policy at the near-zero lower bound for nominal interest rates. This is not merely some academic exercise. The euro area and Japan are still constrained by the zero bound. And, in this era of low inflation and low potential growth, policy rates in advanced economies are likely to hit that lower bound again (see, for example, here). How the Fed and other central banks respond when that happens will depend on the lessons drawn from recent experience...

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