Stern V-Lab

U.S. Gets a Start on Climate-related Financial Risk

Co-authored with Richard Berner, NYU Stern Clinical Professor of Finance and Co-Director, Volatility and Risk Institute.

Many sources of risk threaten the U.S. financial system. Pandemic risk and cyber risk are at or near the top of our list of nightmares. Yet, with the UN Climate Change conference (COP26) under way in Glasgow, attention is shifting to efforts aimed at limiting the economic and financial damage from climate change, including a timely new “Report on Climate-related Financial Risk” from the U.S. Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).

As the Report makes clear, U.S. policymakers need a far better understanding of climate-related financial risk. Indeed, when President Biden issued an executive order in May instructing financial regulators to conduct a thorough risk assessment, the United States already was behind other advanced economies. As an initial response to the President’s directive, the Report catalogs the range of climate risk threats, describes actions individual U.S. regulators have begun taking to address them, and lists many things that still need to be done. By setting priorities, the FSOC is now putting climate change “squarely at the forefront of the agenda of its member agencies.”

In this post, we highlight three themes in the Report: (1) the ongoing rise of physical climate risk; (2) the conceptual challenges associated with measurement, as well as the data gaps; and (3) the benefits of scenario analysis as a tool for assessing the financial stability risks arising from climate change. The key lesson that we draw from scenario analysis is that a financial system resilient to a range of other shocks is more likely to be resilient against climate risk. Put differently, a less-resilient financial system is vulnerable to all types of shocks, including those arising from climate change.

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Stress tests lack COVID-scale stress

In recent months, the Federal Reserve acted aggressively to support nearly all parts of the U.S. economy. Unprecedented monetary policy actions, both in size and scope, served to maintain market function and the flow of credit. And, while we have misgivings about the Fed’s CARES Act-driven moves to support the nonfinancial sector, we applaud Chair Powell and his colleagues for their quick and decisive actions (see our previous posts here, here and here). This, together with fiscal policy support for individual households and small firms, has kept an awful situation from becoming far worse—at least for now.

But, the Fed’s responsibility extends beyond monetary policy to the regulatory and supervisory arenas: it is obliged to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system (and, to some extent, of the broader financial system). On this score, and in stark contrast to its actions in 2009, the Board of Governors has come up significantly short. Without full disclosure of the latest stress test results, suspicions will linger about the ability of the largest banks to provide credit to healthy borrowers if the COVID recovery falters. (See our earlier post for details.)

In this post, we examine the results from the Fed’s 2020 assessment of bank capital adequacy published on June 25. Based on the COVID-related sensitivity analysis—for which individual results are unavailable—one-quarter of the 33 banks tested fall below the regulatory minimum in the worst of the three cases. The fact that we can only guess which banks those might be creates suspicion regarding many banks….

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The Euro Area in the Age of COVID-19

The founders of the euro had little doubt about the common currency’s role as a foundation for European peace and prosperity. Yet, they were not Pollyannas. For years before the start of monetary union in 1999, economists had warned that the member states of the European Union do not constitute an “optimum currency area” (see, for example, Milton Friedman). This means that a single policy interest rate might exacerbate, rather than mitigate, economic differences, creating severe strains among euro area countries.

Since the euro’s beginning, European leaders hoped and expected that as tensions arose, member states would come closer together—integrating their economies and financial systems, sharing burdens and risks. To a considerable extent, experience has borne out these hopes. Despite enormous challenges, no country has abandoned the euro and reintroduced a national currency. Today, an entire generation of people has come of age knowing only the euro. Moreover, as of November 2019, popular support for the single currency among euro area residents was at a record 76%, with sizable majorities in each member state (see Eurobarometer 92, pages 32-33).

And yet, over the past two decades, there has been only grudging progress toward a truly resilient monetary union. Politically and financially, the euro area remains divided. The COVID-19 crisis brings renewed tensions. With it comes a harsh reminder that standing still is simply not an option.

In this post, we review the progress toward completion of the European monetary union, and note key gaps that remain….

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Size is Overrated

This month, in the guise of supporting community banks, the U.S. Senate passed a bill (S.2155) that eases regulation of large banks. We share the critics’ views that this wide-ranging dilution of existing regulation will reduce the resilience of the U.S. financial system.

In its best known and most publicized feature, the Senate bill raises the asset size threshold that Dodd-Frank established for subjecting a bank to strict scrutiny (such as the imposition of stress tests, liquidity requirements, and resolution plans) from $50 billion to $250 billion. In this post, we examine the role of asset size in determining the systemic importance of a financial intermediary. It turns out that (aside from the very largest institutions, where it does in fact dominate) balance sheet size is not a terribly useful indicator of the vulnerability a bank creates. We conclude that Congress should ease the strict oversight burden on institutions that pose little threat to the financial system without raising the Dodd-Frank threshold dramatically.

Judge makes an elegant proposal for accomplishing this. For institutions with assets between $100 billion and $250 billion, Congress should just flip the default. Rather than obliging the Fed to prove a mid-sized bank’s riskiness, give the bank the opportunity to prove it is safe. This approach gives institutions the incentive to limit the systemic risk they create in ways that they can verify. It also sharply reduces the risk of litigation by banks that the Fed deems risky...

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Ending Too Big to Fail

More than six years after the Dodd-Frank Act passed in July 2010, the controversy over how to end “too big to fail” (TBTF) remains a key focus of financial reform. Indeed, TBTF—which led to the troubling bailouts of financial behemoths in the crisis of 2007-2009—is still one of the biggest challenges in reducing the probability and severity of financial crises. By focusing on the largest, most complex, most interconnected financial intermediaries, Dodd-Frank gave officials a range of crisis prevention and management tools. These include the power to designate specific institutions as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), a broadening of Fed supervision, the authority to impose stress tests and living wills, and (with the FDIC’s “Orderly Liquidation Authority”) the ability to facilitate the resolution of a troubled SIFI. But, while Dodd-Frank has likely made the U.S. financial system safer than it was, it does not go far enough in reducing the risk of financial crises or in ensuring credibility of the resolution mechanism (see our earlier commentary here, here and here). It also is exceedingly complex.

Against this background, we welcome the work of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and their recently announced Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big to Fail (the Plan). While the Plan raises issues that require further consideration—including the potential for regulatory arbitrage and the calibration of the tools on which it relies—it is straightforward, based on sound principles, and focuses on cost-effective tools. In this sense, the Plan represents a big step forward...

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