Money, Banking, and Financial Markets

Understand the principles, understand the future

Banks continue to lobby for weaker financial regulation: capital requirements are excessive, liquidity requirements are overly restrictive, and stress tests are too burdensome. Yes, in the aftermath of the 2007-09 financial crisis, we needed reforms, they say, but Basel III and Dodd-Frank have gone too far.

Unfortunately, these complaints are finding sympathetic ears in a variety of places. U.S. authorities are considering changes that would water down existing standards. In Europe, news is not promising either. These developments are not only discouraging, but they are self-defeating. Higher capital clearly improves resilience. And, at current levels of capitalization, it does not limit banks’ ability to support economic activity.

As it turns out, on this particular subject, there may be less of a discrepancy between private and social interests than is commonly believed. The reason is that investors reward banks in jurisdictions where regulators and supervisors promote social welfare through tougher capital standards....

Ten years ago this week, the run on Bear Stearns kicked off the second of three phases of the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2009. In an earlier post, we argued that the crisis began in earnest on August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas suspended redemptions from three mutual funds invested in U.S. subprime mortgage debt. In that first phase of the crisis, the financial strains reflected a scramble for liquidity combined with doubts about the capital adequacy of a widening circle of intermediaries.

In responding to the run on Bear, the Federal Reserve transformed itself into a modern version of Bagehot’s lender of last resort (LOLR) directed at managing a pure liquidity crisis (see, for example, Madigan). Consequently, in the second phase of the GFC—in the period between Bear’s March 14 rescue and the September 15 failure of Lehman—the persistence of financial strains was, in our view, primarily an emerging solvency crisis. In the third phase, following Lehman’s collapse, the focus necessarily turned to recapitalization of the financial system—far beyond the role (or authority) of any LOLR.

In this post, we trace the evolution of the Federal Reserve during the period between Paribas and Bear, as it became a Bagehot LOLR. This sets the stage for a future analysis of the solvency issues that threatened to convert the GFC into another Great Depression.

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Further commentary, click here.

Welcome to ...

... the site where you can learn about finance and economics. We provide commentary on events in the news and on questions of more lasting interest. Because the financial system is constantly evolving, our analysis is informed by a set of core principles: understand the principles, understand the future. The opening excerpts of our two most recent posts appear above. For prior posts, click on the Commentary link to the left, or on the month-by-month Archives to the right. Alternatively, if you are interested in a specific topic, use the tags.

The site also provides material related to our textbook, Money, Banking and Financial Markets, 5th edition, 2017. The Five Core Principles on which the book is based are highlighted here. In addition, Cecchetti and Schoenholtz 5e systematically integrates the use of economic and financial data from FRED, the online database provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Click on FRED Lessons on the left to access help on how to use this incredible resource.

Steve Cecchetti and Kim Schoenholtz

The work on this site is protected by the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International Public License. It may be copied, redistributed, remixed, transformed, or built upon for any purpose, so long as the work is attributed to Cecchetti and Schoenholtz,, and any changes are indicated.

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