Illiquid assets

Open-end Funds vs. ETFs: Lessons from the COVID Stress Test

COVID-19 posed the most severe stress test for financial markets and institutions since the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09. By some measures, the COVID shock’s peak impact was larger than that of the GFC—both the VIX rose higher and intermediaries’ estimated capital shortfalls were bigger. As a result, the COVID experience provides a natural laboratory for testing the resilience of many parts of the post-GFC financial system.

For example, the March 2020 dysfunction in the corporate bond market highlights the extraordinary fragility of a market that accounts for nearly 60% of the debt and borrowings of the nonfinancial corporate sector. Yield spreads over equivalent Treasuries widened further than at any time since the GFC, with bond prices plunging even for instruments that have little risk of default. (See Liang for an excellent overview.)

In this post, we focus on how, because of the contractual agreement with their shareholders, an extraordinary wave of redemptions created selling pressure on corporate bond mutual funds that almost surely exacerbated the liquidity crisis in the corporate bond market. To foreshadow our conclusions, we urge policymakers to find ways to reduce the gap between the illiquidity of the assets held by corporate bond (and some other) mutual funds and the redemption-on-demand that these funds provide. To reduce systemic fragility, we also urge them—as we did several years ago—to consider encouraging conversion of mutual funds holding illiquid assets into ETFs, which suffered relatively less in the COVID crisis….

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Money Funds -- The Empire Strikes Back?

Shortly after Lehman failed in 2008, investors began to flee from money market mutual funds (MMMFs). To halt the run, the U.S. Treasury guaranteed all $3.8 trillion in outstanding MMMF liabilities. That rescue created enduring moral hazard: the expectation that a future crisis will lead to another bailout.

Aside from their legal form as mutual funds, MMMFs functioned much like banks engaged in the transformation of liquidity, credit and (to some extent) maturity. Similar to banks that redeem deposits at face value, they promised investors a fixed share value of $1 (a “buck”) on demand. Unlike depositories, however, MMMFs had no capital, no deposit insurance, and—at least officially—no access to the lender of last resort. So, when the Reserve Primary Fund “broke the buck” (by failing to redeem at the $1 par value) in September 2008, MMMF investors panicked.

Somewhat surprisingly, it took until 2014 for the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to resolve political conflicts and introduce significant rule changes for MMMFs (see our earlier posts here and here). The SEC now requires that institutional prime MMMFs—which (like Reserve Primary) frequently invest in short-term corporate liabilities—operate like other mutual funds with a floating net asset value (NAV). The same rule applies to institutional municipal MMMFs. Retail MMMFs, as well as those investing in federal government (and agency) securities, are exempt.

In light of a recent legislative proposal to water it down, in this post we review the impact of the SEC’s 2014 reform. To highlight our conclusions: (1) it did not go far enough to reduce run risk; (2) aside from temporary dislocations, it has not raised nonfinancial sector funding costs by more than would be accounted for by reducing the implicit taxpayer guarantee for MMMFs; and (3) reversing the floating-NAV requirement would weaken the safety of the U.S. financial system....

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