Thoughts on the FOMC's Monetary Policy Strategy Review -- Part 2 of 4: Is 2 Percent Still the Solution?

Last week, in the first of a four-part series regarding the FOMC's upcoming Monetary Policy Strategy Review, we briefly characterized the Committee's 2020 policy strategy, and then focused on its asymmetry and inflation bias. In this second part of the series, we discuss the level of inflation that the FOMC should target.

For more than three years, inflation has exceeded the 2-percent level that policymakers have targeted – either de facto or de jure – for three decades. This recent experience of above-target inflation raises the question whether the FOMC should raise its inflation target to 3 percent or 4 percent or even higher. A number of economists – including Laurence Ball, Olivier Blanchard , and Jason Furman – answer yes. However, after considering the key benefits and costs of raising the inflation target, we argue that the Fed should continue to set its target at 2 percent.

Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzSeptember 3, 2024 Comment

Thoughts on the FOMC's Monetary Policy Strategy Review: Part 1 of 4

Four years ago, at the conclusion of its first policy strategy review, the Federal Reserve’s Open Market Committee (FOMC) expressed the intention "to undertake roughly every five years a thorough public review of its monetary policy strategy, tools and communications practices." As Chair Powell highlighted recently, that review is set to begin in the next few months. With this prospect in mind, now is an excellent opportunity to highlight those elements of the current strategy that are most in need of attention.

In a series of four posts, we will address the following issues regarding the current strategy: (1) its asymmetry and inflation bias; (2) the inflation target; (3) the policy toolkit; and (4) communications and forward guidance. In this post, we briefly characterize the functioning of the 2020 strategy, and then turn to the first topic on our list: the asymmetry and bias in the current strategy.

Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzAugust 26, 2024

Ten Precepts for 21st Century Regulators

The regulatory reforms that followed the financial crisis of 2007-09 created a financial system that is far more resilient than the one in place 15 years ago. Yet, the events of March 2023 make clear that the progress thus far is simply not enough. To ensure resilience, we need to do more.

To steer the process of further reform, we propose a set of 10 precepts that those who make the rules should keep in mind as they refine the prudential framework. These practical guidelines lead us to conclusions that mirror those in a recent post: regulation should be more rule-based (less reliant on supervisory insight or discretion); simpler and more transparent; stricter and more rigorous; and more efficient in its use of resources. Concretely, this approach means increasing capital and liquidity requirements; shifting to mark-to-market accounting; and improving the transparency, flexibility and severity of capital and liquidity stress tests.

Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzSeptember 18, 2023

Reforming the Federal Home Loan Bank System

We authored this post jointly with our friend and colleague, Lawrence J. White, Robert Kavesh Professor of Economics at the NYU Stern School of Business.

Some government financial institutions strengthen the system; others do not. In the United States, as the lender of last resort (LOLR), the Federal Reserve plays a critical role in stabilizing the financial system. Unfortunately, their LOLR job is made harder by the presence of the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system—a government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) that acts as a lender of next-to-last resort, keeping failing institutions alive and increasing the ultimate costs of their resolution.

We saw this dangerous pattern clearly over the past year when loans (“advances”) from Federal Home Loan Banks (FHLBs) helped postpone the inevitable regulatory reckoning for Silicon Valley Bank (SVB), Signature Bank, and First Republic Bank (see Cecchetti, Schoenholtz and White, Chapter 9 in Acharya et. al. SVB and Beyond: The Banking Stress of 2023).

From a public policy perspective, FHLB advances have extremely undesirable properties. First, in addition to being overcollateralized, these loans are senior to other claims on the borrowing banks—including those of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve: If the borrower defaults, the FHLB lender has a “super-lien.” Second, there is little timely disclosure about the identity of the borrowers or the amount that they borrow. Third, they are willing to provide speedy, low-cost funding to failing institutions—something we assume private lenders would not do.

In this post, we make specific proposals to scale back the FHLB System’s ability to serve as a lender to stressed banks….

Making Banking Safe

The regulatory reforms that followed the financial crisis of 2007-09 created a financial system that is far more resilient than the one we had 15 years ago. Today, banks and some nonbanks face more rigorous capital and liquidity requirements. Improved collateral rules for market-making activities can dampen shocks. And, some institutions are subject to well-structured resolution regimes.

Yet, the events of March 2023 make clear that the system remains fragile. The progress thus far is simply not enough. What else needs to be done?

In a new essay, we address this critical question. Our assessment of the banking system turmoil of 2023 leads us to several obvious conclusions, some of which clearly escaped both bank managers and their supervisors. Perhaps the simplest and most significant is that banks can survive either risky assets or volatile funding, but not both. Another is that supervisors are willing to treat some banks as systemic in death, but not in life.

We also draw two compelling lessons from the recent supervisory and resolution debacles. First, a financial system which relies heavily on supervisory discretion is unlikely to prove resilient. Second, authorities with emergency powers to bail out intermediaries during a panic will always do so. That is, policymakers are incapable of making credible commitments to impose losses on depositors and others. In our view, the only way to address this commitment problem is to prevent crises….

NYU Stern White Paper -- SVB and Beyond: The Banking Stress of 2023

Starting in 2009, coalitions of willing NYU Stern faculty (and their colleagues) published four timely books examining financial instability and regulatory reform. The first—Restoring Financial Instability: How to Repair a Failed System—appeared during the financial crisis of 2007-09 at a time when the Federal Reserve was still working on the watershed stress tests which brought an end the emergency. Later books addressed the Dodd-Frank Act (2010), the failures of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (2011), and the CHOICE Act (2017).

SVB and Beyond: The Banking Stress of 2023, the next in this series, discusses the implications of the recent banking turmoil. Written by a set of Stern faculty (together with several non-NYU co-authors), the 10 essays in this volume analyze the financial and economic causes of the 2023 U.S. banking failures and propose specific remedies for the extraordinary supervisory and accounting failures that contributed to them. (One of us is a co-editor of the new White Paper; and both of us are contributing authors.)

We hope that you will take the time to read SVB and Beyond: The Banking Stress of 2023, which is available as an e-book here.

Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzJuly 17, 2023

The Future of Deposit Insurance

This post is authored jointly with our friend and colleague, Thomas Philippon, Max L. Heine Professor of Finance at the NYU Stern School of Business

Deposit insurance is a key regulatory tool for limiting bank runs and panics. In the United States, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has insured bank deposits since 1934. FDIC-insured deposits are protected by a credible government guarantee, so there is little incentive to run.

However, deposit insurance creates moral hazard. By eliminating the incentive of depositors to monitor their banks, it encourages bank managers to rely on low-cost insured deposits to fund risky activities. In the extreme, with 100% deposit insurance coverage, banks would have virtually no incentive to issue equity or debt.

Against this background, and in light of the events of March-April 2023, we ask what is to be done about deposit insurance. To prevent bank runs, should there be an increase in the legal limit? If so, how can authorities balance the costs of runs and panics against the costs associated with moral hazard, while keeping in mind the potential financial burden on the public? Or, are there alternatives?

We emphasize three promising ways to enhance deposit insurance: a higher insurance cap for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), new resolution rules, and the option to purchase supplementary deposit insurance. In addition, and as regular readers of this blog might expect, we also think that higher capital requirements should be part of the solution: if we require that banks increase the degree to which they finance their assets with capital (rather than deposits), the risk of runs and panics would decline even without raising the cap on deposit insurance….

The Extraordinary Failures Exposed by Silicon Valley Bank's Collapse

The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) revealed an extraordinary range of astonishing failures. There was the failure of the bank’s executives to manage the maturity and liquidity risks that are basic to the business of banking: they failed Money and Banking 101. There was the failure of market discipline by investors who either didn’t notice or didn’t care about the fact that the bank was severely undercapitalized for the better part of a year before it collapsed. There was the failure of the supervisors to compel the bank to manage the simplest and most obvious risks. And, there was the failure of the resolution authorities to act in mid-2022 when SVB’s true net worth had sunk far below the minimum threshold for “prompt corrective action.”

Waiting several quarters to act deepened the threat to the financial system, undermining confidence not only in many other banks but also in the competence of the supervisors. The extraordinary rescue actions last week by both the deposit insurer (FDIC) and the lender of last resort (Federal Reserve) are just a sign of the high costs associated with restoring financial stability when confidence plunges.

In this post we discuss each of these four failures, as well as the actions that authorities took to stabilize the financial system following the SVB failure. To anticipate our conclusions, we see an urgent need for officials to do at least five things:

First, to regain credibility, supervisors need to do an immediate review of the unrealized losses on the balance sheets of all 45 banks with assets in excess of $50 billion.
Second, they should perform a speedy and focused stress test on each of these banks to assess the impact on their true net worth of a sizable further increase in interest rates. Any bank with a capital shortfall should be compelled either to issue new equity or shut down. (To ensure the availability of the necessary resources, authorities will need to have a pool of public funds available to recapitalize banks that cannot attract private investors.)
Third, to restore resilience, Congress must reverse the 2018-19 weakening of regulation that allowed medium-size banks to escape rigorous capital and liquidity requirements.
Fourth, the authorities must change accounting rules to ensure that reported capital more accurately reflects each bank’s true financial condition.
Finally, policymakers should assess the impact on the financial system and on the federal debt arising from the now-implicit promise to insure all deposits in a crisis. To limit risk taking, correspondingly greater fees and higher capital and liquidity requirements should accompany any explicit increase in the cap on deposit insurance.

Managing Disinflation

Large, advanced economy central banks are working hard to lower inflation from 40-year highs. Policy rates are up sharply in Canada, the euro area, the United Kingdom and the United States. While disinflation has started, inflation remains far above policymakers’ common target of 2 percent.

Based on their latest projections published in December, most U.S. Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) participants anticipate a largely benign return to price stability, without a decline in real GDP or a rise of the unemployment rate to much more than 4½ percent. Is this optimism justified? Pointing to the historical record, some prominent analysts wonder whether it is possible to engineer such a large disinflation at what would be such a low cost (see, for example, Lawrence Summers).

This is the setting for this year’s report for the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum that we wrote with Michael Feroli, Peter Hooper and Frederic Mishkin. In the report, we focus on the central challenge facing central banks today: how to minimize the costs of disinflation. To address this question, we employ two approaches: a historical analysis in which we assess the costs of sizable disinflations since the 1950s; and a model-based analysis in which we examine the degree to which policymakers might have been able to anticipate the recent surge of inflation, as well as the path of policy that is likely needed to achieve the desired disinflation.

In the remainder of this post, we summarize the USMPF report’s analysis and conclusions….

Let Crypto Burn

On December 20, one of us (Steve) engaged in a debate with Professor Peter Conti-Brown of the Wharton School on whether crypto should face federal financial regulation. Hosted by the Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy at Brookings, and moderated by Kelly Evans of CNBC, you can watch the one-hour debate here. We found both the questions and the discussion very enlightening. In this post, we will summarize our views, as well as those of Professor Conti-Brown….

Steve Cecchetti and Kim SchoenholtzDecember 21, 2022

Commentary

Money, Banking, and Financial Markets