The collapse of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) revealed an extraordinary range of astonishing failures. There was the failure of the bank’s executives to manage the maturity and liquidity risks that are basic to the business of banking: they failed Money and Banking 101. There was the failure of market discipline by investors who either didn’t notice or didn’t care about the fact that the bank was severely undercapitalized for the better part of a year before it collapsed. There was the failure of the supervisors to compel the bank to manage the simplest and most obvious risks. And, there was the failure of the resolution authorities to act in mid-2022 when SVB’s true net worth had sunk far below the minimum threshold for “prompt corrective action.”
Waiting several quarters to act deepened the threat to the financial system, undermining confidence not only in many other banks but also in the competence of the supervisors. The extraordinary rescue actions last week by both the deposit insurer (FDIC) and the lender of last resort (Federal Reserve) are just a sign of the high costs associated with restoring financial stability when confidence plunges.
In this post we discuss each of these four failures, as well as the actions that authorities took to stabilize the financial system following the SVB failure. To anticipate our conclusions, we see an urgent need for officials to do at least five things:
Second, they should perform a speedy and focused stress test on each of these banks to assess the impact on their true net worth of a sizable further increase in interest rates. Any bank with a capital shortfall should be compelled either to issue new equity or shut down. (To ensure the availability of the necessary resources, authorities will need to have a pool of public funds available to recapitalize banks that cannot attract private investors.)
Third, to restore resilience, Congress must reverse the 2018-19 weakening of regulation that allowed medium-size banks to escape rigorous capital and liquidity requirements.
Fourth, the authorities must change accounting rules to ensure that reported capital more accurately reflects each bank’s true financial condition.
Finally, policymakers should assess the impact on the financial system and on the federal debt arising from the now-implicit promise to insure all deposits in a crisis. To limit risk taking, correspondingly greater fees and higher capital and liquidity requirements should accompany any explicit increase in the cap on deposit insurance.
Bank capital requirements are the focus of contentious and heated debates. Since they limit banks’ ability to take on risk and leverage, owners and managers almost always argue for lowering them. To reduce the likelihood of using public funds for further bailouts, both libertarians and progressives argue strenuously that they should be higher. Focusing on the balance between the social benefits of a more resilient financial system and the social costs of curtailing liquidity and loan provision, academicians usually conclude that current levels are too low. So, with well-financed banks and their lobbyists on one side, and a cohort of advocates armed with academic research on the other, regulators are caught in the middle. To whom should they listen?
The answer to this question is an empirical one, so it is important to base any conclusions on a fair and balanced reading of the evidence. Regular readers of this blog will be unsurprised that we continue to maintain that bank capital requirements should be higher than they were even before the Federal Reserve started began its stealth campaign to relax them several years ago. If we were to pick a number, we would start with a leverage ratio—the ratio of common equity to total assets (including off-balance sheet exposures)—that is in the range of 10 to 15 percent, and possibly higher. The risk-weighted equivalent would be about twice as high in the United States (or three times as high in Europe). (The exact numbers depend on the intricacies of accounting standards.) The one thing we would not be arguing for is a further erosion of capital requirements from their current level.
We start with a short reminder about why we need capital requirements in the first place….
In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09, policymakers were intent on making the financial system able to weather an extremely severe storm. The authorities had two complementary goals: increase the financial system’s reliance on equity financing and enhance the ability of institutions to recapitalize themselves after a shock. Well, COVID-19 is upon us, and the shock looks to be bigger than the most adverse scenarios in supervisory stress tests.
Our view is that we have made limited progress in promoting resilience. In a recent post, we emphasized how COVID-19 economic disruptions are eroding banks’ capital buffers (that already were slim in parts of Asia and Europe). As the full impact economic and financial impact of COVID 19 becomes apparent, we suspect that some banks will need a form of recapitalization. They were not able to do this in 2008-09 on their own. Will this time be different …?
As memories of the 2007-09 financial crisis fade, we worry that complacency is setting in. Recent news is not good. In the name of reducing the regulatory burden on small and some medium-sized firms, the Congress and the President enacted legislation that eased the requirements on some of the largest firms. Under the current Administration, several Treasury reports travel the same road, proposing ways to ease regulatory scrutiny of large entities without changing the law (see here, here and here). And, recently, the Federal Reserve Board altered its stress test in ways that make it more likely that poorly managed firms will pass. It also voted not to raise capital requirements on systemically risky banks over the next 12 months.
A few weeks ago, one of us (Steve) had the privilege to speak at the 20th Risk Convention of the Global Association of Risk Professionals (GARP). Founded in 1996, GARP engages in the education and certification of risk professionals and has several hundred thousand members worldwide. (Disclosure: Brandeis International Business School and NYU Stern are GARP Academic Partners.) The organizers allowed us to solicit the views of the 100-plus attendees on two issues that are central to financial resilience: Are bank capital requirements high enough? And, do central counterparties (CCPs) have sufficient loss-absorbing buffers? They answered both questions with a resounding “NO” ….
Debt causes fragility. When banks lack equity funding, even a small adverse shock can put the financial system at risk. Fire sales can undermine the supply of credit to healthy firms, precipitating a decline in economic activity. The failure of key institutions can threaten the payments system. Authorities naturally respond by increasing required levels of equity finance, ensuring that intermediaries can weather severe conditions without damaging others.
Readers of this blog know that we are strong supporters of higher capital requirements: if forced to pick a number, we might choose a leverage ratio requirement in the range of 15% of total exposure (see here), roughly twice recent levels for the largest U.S. banks. But as socially desirable as high levels of equity finance might be, the fact is that they are privately costly. As a result, rather than limit threats to the financial system, higher capital requirements for banks have the potential to shift risky activities beyond the regulatory perimeter into non-bank intermediaries (see, for example here).
Has the increase of capital requirements since the financial crisis pushed risk-taking beyond the regulated banking system? So far, the answer is no. However, in some jurisdictions, especially the United States, the framework for containing systemic risk arising from non-bank financial institutions remains inadequate….
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 taught us many lessons about monetary policy. Most importantly, we learned that when financial systems are impaired, central banks can backstop both illiquid institutions and illiquid markets. Actively lending to solvent intermediaries against a broad range of collateral, purchasing assets other than those issued by sovereigns, and expanding their balance sheets can limit disruptions to the real economy while preserving price stability.
We also learned that nominal interest rates can be negative, at least somewhat. But in reducing interest rates below zero―as has happened in Denmark, Hungary, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland and the Euro Area―policymakers face concerns about whether their actions will have the desired expansionary effect (see here). At positive interest rates, when central bankers ease, they influence the real economy in part by expanding banks’ willingness and ability to lend. Does this bank lending channel work as well when interest rates are negative?
Why should there be any sort of asymmetry at zero? Banks run a spread business: they care about the difference between the interest rate they charge on their loans and the one they pay on their deposits, not the level of rates per se. In practice, however, zero matters because banks are loathe to lower their deposit rates below zero….
We submitted this statement to the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit of the Committee on Financial Services of the U.S. House of Representatives for its hearing on July 17, 2018.
We appreciate the opportunity to submit the following statement on the occasion of the hearing entitled “Examining Capital Regimes for Financial Institutions.” We welcome the Subcommittee’s further examination of the existing regulatory approach for prudentially regulated financial institutions.
We are academic experts in financial regulation with extensive knowledge of the financial industry. Our experience includes working with private sector financial institutions, government agencies and international organizations. In our view, a strong and resilient financial system is an essential foundation of a thriving economy. The welfare of every modern society depends on it. The bedrock of this foundation is that banks’ capital buffers are sufficient to withstand significant stress without recourse to public funds. Furthermore, it is our considered view that the benefits of raising U.S. capital requirements from their current modest levels clearly outweigh the costs.
To explain this conclusion, we start with a definition of bank capital, including a discussion of its importance as a mechanism for self-insurance. We then turn to capital regulation and a discussion of stress testing….
We find your January 31 letter to Federal Reserve Board Chair Janet Yellen both misleading and misguided.
It is in the best interest of U.S. citizens and our financial system that the Federal Reserve (and all the other U.S. regulators) continue to participate actively in international financial-standard-setting bodies. The Congress has many opportunities to hold the Fed accountable for its regulatory actions, which are very transparent. We hope that the new U.S. Administration will support the Fed’s efforts to promote a safe and efficient global financial system.
Your letter is filled with false assumptions and assertions....
Readers of this blog know that we are great fans of the Stern Volatility Lab’s estimates of systemic risk. Like many observers, including leading regulators, we find market-value rather than book-value measures of bank equity more useful for timely monitoring of systemic risk created by individual intermediaries. Equity prices are available in real time, rapidly incorporate bank-specific and economy-wide information, and are forward-looking. This makes them particularly helpful in assessing the impact of big events, like this summer’s Brexit referendum (see our earlier post).
So, based as it is on market indicators of bank risk, not surprisingly we share the recent assessment of Sarin and Summers (expressed in their September 2016 Brookings paper) that the increase of book capital in the banking system since the financial crisis ought not give rise to regulatory complacency. We have argued repeatedly for raising capital requirements (see, for example, here) and, like those authors, believe that we need mechanisms for the virtually automatic recapitalization of banks in a crisis (see here).
We are huge fans of stress tests. In many ways, they are the best macroprudential tool we have for reducing the frequency and severity of financial crises.
The idea behind stress tests is simple: see if all financial institutions can simultaneously withstand a major negative macroeconomic event—a big fall in real output, a large decline in equity and property prices, a substantial widening of interest-rate spreads, an adverse move in the exchange rate. And, importantly, assume that in response to these adverse circumstances banks have no way to sell assets or raise equity. That is, the stress test asks whether each intermediary can stand on its own without help in the middle of an economic maelstrom. But for stress tests to be effective, they must be truly stressful. The tempest has to be the financial equivalent of a severe hurricane, not just a tropical storm.
This brings us to the latest European Banking Authority (EBA) 2016 stress tests. As we mentioned recently, the European financial system may be the biggest source of systemic risk globally. So, these tests are important not just for Europe, but for the world as a whole. Unfortunately, they just aren’t severe enough, so there is little reason to be confident about the resilience of European finance...
The U.K. Brexit referendum is providing us with the first significant test of our sparkling new regulatory system. Everyone knew about the referendum months in advance, giving them plenty of time to prepare. Yet, we are left with some fundamental questions related to global financial stability. Do banks have sufficient capital and liquidity to withstand the “shock?” Will financial markets continue to serve their key functions? Or, is the financial system only as strong as its weakest link? Will turmoil once again prompt liability holders to run, triggering asset fire sales, and compelling central banks once again to do whatever it takes to keep avert a meltdown?
As the rating agencies might say, we are on “stress watch” with a negative outlook. Or, to mix metaphors, numerous lights are flashing yellow, so we are worried...
In the days after the U.K. Brexit referendum, that was the leading question many people were asking. It is the right question. Unfortunately, despite years of regulatory reform in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the answer is: we don’t know. That is why policymakers are especially worried about heightened financial volatility in the aftermath of U.K. voters’ decision to leave the European Union....
Capital—the excess of assets over liabilities—determines solvency, so policymakers are used to thinking of it as a tool for keeping banks and the banking system safe. House Financial Services Chair Hensarling’s proposal to allow banks to opt for a simple capital standard that would substitute for other regulatory oversight is just the most recent example.
But bank capital also is a critical factor in the transmission of monetary policy. When central banks ease, their actions are intended to encourage banks to lend and firms to borrow. And, to put it simply: healthy banks lend to healthy firms, while weak banks lend to weak firms (if at all)....
Along with enormous misery, the financial crisis brought an opportunity for long-needed reform. At the top of the list was the clear need for more bank capital. To ensure resilience of the financial system, and protect the public purse, banks’ owners had to have much more skin in the game. That is, potential losses to equity holders had to go way up.
Unfortunately, the 2010 Basel III agreement missed this rare opportunity to make the financial system safe. And now, with the publication of the standards for what has come to be known as total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC), the disappointment continues to grow. To understand why, we need to step back and address the big question for bank capital: how much is enough...?
The recent international agreement to improve the loss-absorbing capacity of globally active banks is an important move in the right direction. But financial regulators should go significantly further to make these banks and the global financial system resilient...
When a financial system is hit by unforeseen, adverse events, bank capital is the first line of defense. Capital, or net worth, is the owners’ stake in the bank. Profits and losses from a bank’s activities alter its net worth, guiding investment and risk-taking. If losses wipe out its capital, the bank becomes insolvent – its assets are inadequate to cover its fixed liabilities – and typically fails...
The Group of Seven is very upset with Russia for its treatment of Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea.So far, Europe and the United States are responding with various economic sanctions.
Sanctions can impose substantial pain on a country, cutting it off from the global economic and financial system.Such isolation would matter for Russia, which is a reasonably open economy. For example, its goods and services imports and exports are 22% and 29% of GDP, respectively.
