Coronavirus

An Economic Zombie Survival Guide

Everyone surely hopes that zombies will remain confined to the growing list of horror movies. But unless we shut them down, insolvent firms can become economic zombies that suffocate innovation and growth.

As the COVID pandemic continues, policymakers will face some difficult decisions. Many businesses are coming under increasingly severe financial stress. Some, like dry-cleaning establishments that rely on laundering clothing for office workers, have limited prospects even after the pandemic subsides. But there are others that have a bright post-COVID future if they can hold on long enough. Without a way to distinguish these two groups, we face an unpleasant choice of either creating zombies or allowing viable firms to perish.

In our view, the solution to this problem is to reinforce and modify the bankruptcy process. This means ensuring that there are sufficient resources to restructure the debts of those whose expected future profits exceed their liquidation value, while allowing the remainder to close. In the case of large corporations, we can make use of Chapter 11. For smaller firms, if it is not already too late, we need a low-cost mechanism more tailored to their needs.

In the remainder of this post, we discuss these two related issues: zombie firms and the use of bankruptcy procedures to identify and sustain viable firms.

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Stress tests lack COVID-scale stress

In recent months, the Federal Reserve acted aggressively to support nearly all parts of the U.S. economy. Unprecedented monetary policy actions, both in size and scope, served to maintain market function and the flow of credit. And, while we have misgivings about the Fed’s CARES Act-driven moves to support the nonfinancial sector, we applaud Chair Powell and his colleagues for their quick and decisive actions (see our previous posts here, here and here). This, together with fiscal policy support for individual households and small firms, has kept an awful situation from becoming far worse—at least for now.

But, the Fed’s responsibility extends beyond monetary policy to the regulatory and supervisory arenas: it is obliged to maintain the safety and soundness of the banking system (and, to some extent, of the broader financial system). On this score, and in stark contrast to its actions in 2009, the Board of Governors has come up significantly short. Without full disclosure of the latest stress test results, suspicions will linger about the ability of the largest banks to provide credit to healthy borrowers if the COVID recovery falters. (See our earlier post for details.)

In this post, we examine the results from the Fed’s 2020 assessment of bank capital adequacy published on June 25. Based on the COVID-related sensitivity analysis—for which individual results are unavailable—one-quarter of the 33 banks tested fall below the regulatory minimum in the worst of the three cases. The fact that we can only guess which banks those might be creates suspicion regarding many banks….

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An Open Letter to Randal K. Quarles, Federal Reserve Vice Chair for Supervision

Dear Vice Chair Quarles,

Nearly three years ago, we wrote an open letter congratulating you on your nomination as the first Vice Chair for Supervision on the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In that letter, we highlight the central mission of ensuring the resilience and promoting the dynamism of the U.S. financial system.

Today we write to express our profound disappointment regarding the plans (expressed in your June 19 speech on “The Adaptability of Stress Testing“) to limit the disclosure of this year’s large-bank stress tests. In our view, failure to publish the individual bank results from the special COVID-19 related “sensitivity analysis” weakens the credibility and effectiveness of the Fed’s stress testing regime.

Consequently, we urge you to reverse course and to announce this week the individual bank sensitivity results, along with the aggregates. To put it bluntly, the point of a supervisory stress test is disclosure. Anything short of full transparency leaves potentially destabilizing questions unanswered.

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COVID-19 Economic Downturn: What do cyclical norms suggest?

Business cycle downturns come in many forms. Some are big, others small. Some are long, others short. Some result from policy errors or euphoric booms, while others are the consequence of external events.

Nevertheless, downturns have some common features and regularities. Among those that have been reasonably stable over much of the past half century are the relationships among unemployment, activity and federal budget deficits. Using these, we explore the impact of the U.S. COVID-19 economic downturn that began last month.

To sum up, recent labor market developments already make clear that we are in the midst of the deepest recession since the 1930s. In fact, the coordinated shutdown of a large swath of the American economy has made this plunge more rapid than that of the Depression. Whether we are at the start of a second Depression depends greatly on how long we keep the economy in a state of suspended animation.

If the lockdown extends from weeks to months, the short-term pain will turn into long-term scarring. The longer it takes to reopen businesses safely, the more damage we will do to the many linkages and networks (including lender-borrower, supplier-user and employer-employee relationships) that make up the fabric of the economy. As the wave of bankruptcies grows, damage to the financial system will increase, as will the resulting harm to the economy’s productive capacity….

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The Fed Goes to War: Part 3

For the second time this century, the Federal Reserve is a crisis manager. In this role, policymakers can lend to solvent but illiquid intermediaries (as the lender of last resort). They can backstop financial markets (as a market maker of last resort). And, when all else fails, they can take the place of dysfunctional private-sector intermediaries.

During the first financial crisis of the 21st century, the Fed’s response shifted from one role to the next as the crisis intensified. Yet, even compared to that massive crisis response, the Fed’s recent moves are breathtaking—in speed, scale and scope.

Indeed, with its most recent announcements on April 9, the Federal Reserve is committed to an unprecedented course of action to ensure the flow of credit to virtually every part of the economy. In carrying out its obligations under the newly enacted CARES Act, the Fed is effectively transforming itself into a state bank that allocates credit to the nonfinancial sectors of the economy.

Yet, picking winners and losers is not a sustainable assignment for independent technocrats. It is a role for fiscal authorities, not central bankers. Instead of using the Fed as an off-balance sheet vehicle for the federal government, we hope that Congress will shift these CARES Act obligations from the Federal Reserve to the Treasury, where they belong….

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On the Resilience of Large U.S. banks

In the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2007-09, policymakers were intent on making the financial system able to weather an extremely severe storm. The authorities had two complementary goals: increase the financial system’s reliance on equity financing and enhance the ability of institutions to recapitalize themselves after a shock. Well, COVID-19 is upon us, and the shock looks to be bigger than the most adverse scenarios in supervisory stress tests.

Our view is that we have made limited progress in promoting resilience. In a recent post, we emphasized how COVID-19 economic disruptions are eroding banks’ capital buffers (that already were slim in parts of Asia and Europe). As the full impact economic and financial impact of COVID 19 becomes apparent, we suspect that some banks will need a form of recapitalization. They were not able to do this in 2008-09 on their own. Will this time be different …?

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COVID-19 Stress Test

The COVID-19 shock is almost surely leading to a larger economic downturn than the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09. However valuable, neither stress tests nor financial supervision in general has prepared us for a shock of this magnitude.

These developments leave us profoundly concerned that the global financial system lacks the resilience needed to weather what will clearly be a very violent storm. In our view, the most up-to-date information regarding the impact on the financial system of COVID-19 comes from NYU Stern Volatility Lab’s SRISK. By utilizing timely weekly market equity data, rather than less accurate and substantially delayed book-value information, SRISK enables us to gauge the aggregate shortfall of capital in the financial system during a crisis (defined as a 40 percent drop of the global equity market over the next six months). Analogous to a severe stress test, the idea behind SRISK is that an intermediary contributes to fragility to the extent that it is short of capital at the same time that there is a system-wide shortfall (see, for example, here). Just as a forest is more vulnerable to fire during a drought, so the financial system is more vulnerable to a large shock when there is a large aggregate capital shortfall.

In the remainder of this post, we highlight some recent SRISK developments and compare them to those during the 2007-09 crisis. We view these developments as a clear warning to regulators and supervisors that the COVID-19 shock meaningfully threatens financial stability across major jurisdictions….

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The Fed Goes to War: Part 1

Over the past two weeks, the Federal Reserve has resurrected many of the policy tools that took many months to develop during the Great Financial Crisis of 2007-09 and several years to refine during the post-crisis recovery. The Fed was then learning through trial and error how to serve as an effective lender of last resort (see Tucker) and how to deploy the “new monetary policy tools” that are now part of central banks’ standard weaponry.

The good news is that the Fed’s crisis management muscles remain strong. The bad news is that the challenges of the Corona War are unprecedented. Success will require extraordinary creativity and flexibility from every part of the government. As in any war, the central bank needs to find additional ways to support the government’s efforts to steady the economy. A key challenge is to do so in a manner that allows for a smooth return to “peacetime” policy practices when the war is past.

In this post, we review the rationale for reintroducing the resurrected policy tools, distinguishing between those intended to restore market function or substitute for private intermediation, and those meant to alter financial conditions to support aggregate demand….

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COVID-19: What can monetary policy do?

Two weeks prior to their regularly scheduled mid-March meeting, the members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) voted unanimously to cut their target policy rate by 50 basis points to the 1 to 1¼ percent range. Policymakers attributed their exceptional decision to the “evolving risks” posed by the coronavirus. This move was the first inter-meeting policy rate shift, and the largest cut, since late 2008, at the depth of the financial crisis. Moreover, this time the move came against the background of a strong economy. Nevertheless, based on futures prices, market participants anticipate a further 75-basis-point cut in the target federal funds rate this month!

The coronavirus has thrust us into uncharted territory. Do central bankers really have any tools to guide us back to safer ground?

In the remainder of this post, we discuss the importance for policymakers of distinguishing between shocks to aggregate supply and demand. Importantly, while monetary policy can combat demand shocks, it can do nothing to cushion the impact of reductions in supply without sacrificing the commitment to price stability. The coronavirus shock involves some as-yet-unknown mix of these two very different types of shocks. Yet, given the limited amount of conventional policy space, and the decline of long-term inflation expectations, there is a good case for the FOMC to act rapidly and aggressively….

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Contagion: Bank Runs and COVID-19

There are currently more than 85,000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 in at least 60 countries. Yet, we know very little about this pathogen, except that everyone is worried. And, with the number of cases rising each day, intensifying concerns probably will lead many people to behave in ways that undermine economic activity. They will shy away from places where the virus can be transmitted. That means avoiding mass transit, schools, and workplaces.

Moreover, many people will stay away until they are confident that the disease is manageable. That confidence probably requires an effective treatment, a very low likelihood of infection, or both. Not surprisingly, many observers are reducing their projections for economic growth this year, while financial market participants anticipate easier monetary policy to cushion the shock.

The challenge of re-establishing public confidence that it is safe to venture out bears striking similarity to the one that authorities face in stemming a bank run. Our ability to identify and quarantine people infected with COVID-19 is analogous to our ability to recognize and isolate a bank bordering on insolvency. This and other similarities suggest that the means we use to control bank runs also may be useful in managing the economic consequences of an emerging pandemic like COVID-19….

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