Over the past 40 years, U.S. capital markets have grown much faster than banks, so that banks’ share of credit to the private nonfinancial sector has dropped from 55% to 34% (see BIS statistics here). Nevertheless, banks remain a critical part of the financial system. They operate the payments system, supply credit, and serve as agents and catalysts for a wide range of other financial transactions. As a result, their well-being remains a key concern. A resilient banking system is, above all, one that has sufficient capital to weather the loan defaults and declines in asset values that will inevitably come.
In this primer, we explain the nature of bank capital, highlighting its role as a form of self-insurance providing both a buffer against unforeseen losses and an incentive to manage risk-taking. We describe some of the challenges in measuring capital and briefly discuss a range of approaches for setting capital requirements. While we do not know the optimal level of capital that banks (or other intermediaries) should be required to hold, we suggest a practical approach for setting requirements that would promote the safety of the financial system without diminishing its efficiency.... Read More
Last month, the Federal Reserve Board published proposed refinements to its annual Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR) exercise—the supervisory stress test that evaluates the capital adequacy of the largest U.S. banks (34 in the 2017 test). In our view, the Federal Reserve has an effective framework for carrying out these all-important stress tests. Having started in 2011, the Fed is now embarking on only the seventh CCAR exercise. That means that everyone is still learning how to best structure and execute the tests. The December proposals are clearly in this spirit.
With this same goal in mind, we make the following proposals for enhancing the stress tests and preserving their effectiveness:
--- Change the scenarios more aggressively and unexpectedly, continuing to disclose them only after banks’ exposures are fixed. Read More
--- Introduce an experimental scenario (that will not be used in “grading” the bank’s relative performance or capital plans) to assess the implications of events outside of historical experience and to probe for weaknesses in the system.
--- As a way to evaluate banks’ internal models, require publication of loss rates or risk-weighted assets for the same hypothetical portfolios for which the Fed is disclosing its estimates.
--- Stick with the annual CCAR cycle....
After nearly a decade of negotiations, last month, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision completed the Basel III post-crisis reforms to capital regulation. The final standards include refinements to: credit risk measurement and the computation of risk-weighted assets; the calculation of off-balance-sheet exposures and of the requirements to address operational risk; and the leverage ratio requirement for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs).
In this post, we focus on revisions to the way in which banks compute risk-weighted assets. To foreshadow our conclusion: the new approach adds unnecessarily to regulatory complexity. If the concern is that current risk-based requirements result in insufficient capital, it would be better simply to raise the requirements. Read More
More than six years after the Dodd-Frank Act passed in July 2010, the controversy over how to end “too big to fail” (TBTF) remains a key focus of financial reform. Indeed, TBTF—which led to the troubling bailouts of financial behemoths in the crisis of 2007-2009—is still one of the biggest challenges in reducing the probability and severity of financial crises. By focusing on the largest, most complex, most interconnected financial intermediaries, Dodd-Frank gave officials a range of crisis prevention and management tools. These include the power to designate specific institutions as systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), a broadening of Fed supervision, the authority to impose stress tests and living wills, and (with the FDIC’s “Orderly Liquidation Authority”) the ability to facilitate the resolution of a troubled SIFI. But, while Dodd-Frank has likely made the U.S. financial system safer than it was, it does not go far enough in reducing the risk of financial crises or in ensuring credibility of the resolution mechanism (see our earlier commentary here, here and here). It also is exceedingly complex.
Against this background, we welcome the work of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and their recently announced Minneapolis Plan to End Too Big to Fail (the Plan). While the Plan raises issues that require further consideration—including the potential for regulatory arbitrage and the calibration of the tools on which it relies—it is straightforward, based on sound principles, and focuses on cost-effective tools. In this sense, the Plan represents a big step forward... Read More
“We have listened to the wisdom of an old Russian maxim, doveryai, no proveryai—trust, but verify.” President Ronald Reagan at the signing of the INF Treaty, December 8, 1987.
In July 2010, central bank governors and supervisors from the 28 jurisdictions that make up the Basel Committee membership were hammering out the agreement on new capital and liquidity requirements now known as Basel III. There was a large sticking point. Some members were standing firm on their desire to have higher capital requirements. Others felt that this would make credit more expensive and less plentiful.
Had agreement not been reached, those insisting on more capital might have said: “Go ahead, be permissive. But if you let your banks operate with low levels of capital, we’ll restrict our banks from doing business with them.” Fortunately, it didn’t come to that.... Read More
Along with enormous misery, the financial crisis brought an opportunity for long-needed reform. At the top of the list was the clear need for more bank capital. To ensure resilience of the financial system, and protect the public purse, banks’ owners had to have much more skin in the game. That is, potential losses to equity holders had to go way up.
Unfortunately, the 2010 Basel III agreement missed this rare opportunity to make the financial system safe. And now, with the publication of the standards for what has come to be known as total loss-absorbing capacity (TLAC), the disappointment continues to grow. To understand why, we need to step back and address the big question for bank capital: how much is enough...? Read More
The recent international agreement to improve the loss-absorbing capacity of globally active banks is an important move in the right direction. But financial regulators should go significantly further to make these banks and the global financial system resilient... Read More